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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Backman Property is landlocked. The underlying issue in this appeal is whether or 
not Idaho law permits landlocked property to remain landlocked. Respondents Spagon, et al. 
("Spagon") and Respondents Grant ("Grant") cite to cases and submit arguments that, taken 
collectively, would result in Idaho real property remaining landlocked, unused, unoccupied and 
undeveloped. Such a result directly contravenes Idaho's stated public policies reflected in this 
Court's prior decisions promoting the use, occupancy and cultivation of land, and that oppose 
leaving property landlocked. 
The fact is that Idaho law does provide mechanisms to obtain access to landlocked 
property. These mechanisms are rooted in the public policies that promote the use and 
occupancy of land and oppose leaving property landlocked. Backmans have presented three 
alternative theories pursuant to which this Court could grant them access to the Landlocked 
Backman Property. If Backmans fail to establish their claim for a prescriptive easement, then the 
necessity is established for Backmans' easement by necessity and private condemnation claims. 
If the Court denies Backmans' claim for an easement by necessity, then Backmans should be 
permitted to privately condemn access to the landlocked Backman Property. 
Here, Backmans did not freely convey away the access to their property. On the 
contrary, the Backman Property has been landlocked since its patent in 1905. Although all of the 
property in Sections 7 and 8 was historically used for logging, the current state of the land 
reflects increasing residential development. Section 7 is checkered with 10- to 20-acre private 
residential developments. If the roles were reversed and the Spagon and Grant properties were 
landlocked, they would be entitled to benefit from the Idaho statutes and caselaw enabling 
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landowners to obtain access to their Iandlockcd property. Simply, a group of private landowners 
should not be permitted to landlock neighboring property. 
Permitting Backmans to access their property promotes the strong public policy of the 
State of Idaho favoring the use, occupancy and cultivation of land. This Court should find that 
Rackmans have access to the Backman Property either by an easement by necessity, private 
condemnation or a prescriptive easement. 
A. This Court Should Hold That Backmans Are Permitted To Access The Backman 
Propcrtv With An Easement Bv Necessitv. 
1. Backmans' Evidence of Common Ownership bv the United States is 
Sufficient to Satisfv the UniW of Title Element of Their Easement bq: 
Necessitv Claim. 
There is a split of authority in both the caselaw and secondary materials regarding 
whether or not government ownership satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by 
necessity claim. Not surprisingly, Spagon and Grant advocate for a different rule and cite to the 
cases and treatises in line with their position. Of all of the cases cited by Spagon and Grant in 
their respective Respondents' Briefs, only two expressly hold that government ownership does 
not satisfy the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim. Guess v. Azur, 57 So.2d 
443 (Fl. 1952); Stale v. Black Bros., 297 S.W. 213 (Tex. 1927). The more recent case is dated 
1952. 
Contrary to Spagon's argument, the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Leo Sheep Co. v. United Stutes does not directly address whether or not government ownership 
satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim asserted. by a private 
landowner. 440 U.S. 668 (1979) . Instead, the issue addressed by the Court in Leo Sheep was 
whether the Union Pacific Act of 1862 carried with it an implied reservation of access in favor of 
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the federal government over the lands that had been granted to private railroads. Id at 680-81. 
In Leo Sheep, the federal government sought an implied easement to build a road over adjacent 
land owned by private landowners. Id. at 669. In rejecting the government's easement by 
necessity claim, the Court explained: 
Where a private landowner conveys to another individual a 
portion of his lands in a certain area and retains the rest, it is 
presumed at common law that the grantor has reserved an 
easement to pass over the granted property is such passage is 
necessary to reach the retained property. These rights-of-way 
are referred to as "easements by necessity." There are two 
problems with the Government's reliance on that notion in 
this case. First of all. whatever right of passage a private 
landowner might have, it is not at all clear that it would 
include the right to construct a road for public access to a 
recreational area. More importantly, the easement is not 
actually a matter of necessitv in this case because the 
Government has the power of eminent domain. 
..,. 
The applicability of the doctrine of easement by necessity in 
this case is, therefore, somewhat strained, and ultimately of 
little significance. The pertinent inquirv in this case is the 
intent of Congress when it granted land to the Union Pacific 
in 1862. The 1862 Act specifically listed reservations to the 
grant, and we do not find the tenuous relevance of the 
common-law doctrine of ways of necessity sufficient to 
overcome the inference prompted by the omission of any 
reference to the reserved right asserted by the Government in 
this case. It is possible that Congress gave the problem of 
access little though; but it is at least a likely that the thought 
which was given focused on negotiation, reciprocity 
considerations, and the power of eminent domain as obvious 
devices for ameliorating disputes. 
Id. at 679-80 (emphasis added) . 
Leo Sheep involved a limited analysis of a federal railroad land grant statute in the 
context of the federal government's claim for an easement by necessity to provide public access 
to recreational property. Therefore, Leo Sheep is distinguishable from the facts of this case. 
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Here, no federal statute is at issue and Backmans are privale landowners with no power of 
eminent domain seeking private access to their private property. In any event, Leo Sheep, as a 
United States Supreme Court decision, represents, at best, only persuasive authority on a 
question of Idaho state law. 
The more recent treatises and decisions cited in Backmans' Appellants' Brief 
recognize that the better rule is to allow government ownership to satisfy the unity of title 
element of an easement by necessity claim. As one commentator explained: 
Special problems concerning easements by necessity are 
encountered where the only unity of title was the original 
ownership by the government. A considerable number of 
decisions can be found refusing to allow an easement by 
necessity where the claimant has relied upon such original 
unity of ownership. The courts did not base these decisions 
upon the prerogative of the sovereign. There are, however, 
some decisions permitting easements by necessity upon such 
proof, and this is believed to represent the wiser holding .... 
It has been suggested that the more liberal rule would permit 
every remote grantee of a portion of the public domain to 
have an easement of way by necessity over surrounding 
lands. This argument overlooks the special terminability 
aspect of easements by necessity upon a change of 
circumstances. The changed circumstances effectively 
eliminate the necessity. 
4 Michael Allan Wolf (ed.), Powell on Real Property § 34.07[4] (2006), p. 34-59 - 34-60 
(emphasis added). 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 2.15 (2000), also supports 
government ownership as satisfying the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim. 
The general Restatement rule as to easements by necessity provides: 
2.15 Servitudes Created By Necessity 
A conveyance that would otherwise deprive the land 
conveyed to the grantee, or land retained by the grantor, of 
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rights necessary to reasonable enjoyment of the land implies 
the creation of a servitude granting or reserving such rights, 
unless the language or circumstances of the conveyance 
clearly indicate that the parties intended to deprive the 
property of those rights. 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (i 2.15 (2000). Comment c. to this section, entitled 
"Severance of rights arising out of common ownership is required," states that "Servitudes by 
necessity arise only on severance of rights held in a unity of ownership .... Servitudes by 
necessity arise on conveyances by governmental bodies as well as by other grantors." (Emphasis 
added.) Id, at cmt. c. 
The parties agree that Roberts v. Swim is the only Idaho case addressing 
government ownership and the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim. 
117 Idaho 9 (Ct.App. 1989). As Grant recognizes in its Rcspondents' Brief, Idaho Court of 
Appeals' decisions are not binding case law precedent on the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. 
Morton, 140 Idaho 235, 238 (2004). The Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts would perhaps 
be more persuasive if it had included an analysis of why it determined that government 
ownership did not satisfy the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim or such a 
determination was germane to the case. Instead, the Court of Appeals merely cited to an A.L.R. 
annotation. Roberts, 117 Idaho at 15. Importantly, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to 
the district court to craft more particularized findings on the claimant's prescriptive easement 
claim. Id. at 16-17, As such, the Court did not need to address, in dicta, the easement by 
necessity claim. 
Backmans submit that the better rule of law is that government ownership 
satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim. Such a rule would promote 
Idaho's "sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or successful 
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cultivation." Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 79 (Ct.App. 1983) (quoting Burley Brick & Sand 
Co. v. Cofir, 102 Idaho 333, 335 (1981)). For these reasons, this Court should overrule the dicla 
reference in Roberts and hold that Backmans proved the unity of title element of their easement 
by necessity claim with evidence of the common ownership by the United States. 
2. Backmans Proved Necessity for the Easement to Access the Idandlocked 
Backman Proaertv. 
Backmans proved that there has never been legal access to the Backman Property 
since the date the Backman Property was first patented by the United States government. The 
District Court found the Backman Property was historically and is presently landlocked, and that 
unless the District Court ordered access, the Backman Property would remain landlocked. 
R. Vol. II., p. 268. Backmans submit that Backmans' proof and the District Court's factual 
findings are sufficient to establish the "necessity" elements of an easement by necessity claim. 
Spagon's argument about the historical existence or nonexistence of roads across 
Section 7 is not relevant to the Court's decision in this case. Idaho case law holds that an actual 
developed road need not exist at the time of severance. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 79. As explained 
by the court in Cordwell: 
It should be reemphasized that the existence of a way of 
necessity does not depend upon what use the common owner 
was making of the roads existing at the time of severance. 
Such easement could arise even if at the time of severance 
there was no road across the grantor's property to the part 
conveyed. Thus, a remote grantee of land not being used at 
the time of severance-as in the present case-may 
nevertheless, when the use becomes necessary to the 
enjoyment of his property, claim the easement under this 
remote deed. 
Id. (emphasis added) . 
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Backmans also proved great present necessity for an access easement. Proof of 
"strict" necessity for an easement is only required where the claimant owns other lands that abut 
a public way. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 80. Here, the Backman Property is landlocked. Therefore, 
Backmans were only required to prove that access was reasonably necessary. Id. Backmans 
proved that the Backman Property has always been legally landlocked and set forth an existing 
route that had been used for over seventy (70) years to access the Backman Property. 
Backmans' proposed route is the only reasonable route providing access to Section 8. 
Backmans' road expert, Scott Rasor, testified that except for the three extensions off of 
Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road accessing the Backman Property from the west, he did 
not find any other feasible access to the Backman Property from the north, east or south. 
Tr. p. 144-45. 
This Court should hold that Backmans' proof and the District Court's factual 
findings are sufficient to establish the "necessity" elements and hold that Backmans are entitled 
to an easement by necessity over and across Turtle Rock Road/Syringa Creek Road, and the 
three extensions, onto the Backman Property. This case should then be remanded to the District 
Court to determine the scope of the easement. 
B. Backmans Should Be Permitted To Privately Condemn An Easement For Access To 
The Backman Pro~ertv. 
Backmans have proved the elements of their private condemnation claim. Spagon would 
have this Court believe that Cohen v. Larson represented this Court's rejection of private 
condemnation for the purpose of obtaining access to residences. 125 Idaho 82 (1993) . Contrary 
to Spagon's characterization of that case, Cohen is not dispositive. The Court in Cohen did not 
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address Idaho Code (i 7-701, which expressly states that "[blyroads, leading from highways to 
residences" is a public use for which "the right of eminent domain may be exercised." 
The Court in Cohen recognized the legislature's role in defining the changing 
characteristics of "public uses" under Idaho law. The Court stated: 
The notion of public use is a flexible one depending on the needs 
and wants of the community, and we note that the public, the 
legislature, and the courts of this state have demonstrated an 
awareness of public benefits, including environmental and 
population concerns, that perhaps were not recognized a century 
ago. 
Id. at 84. Thus, the Court recognized that the definition of "public use" must he interpreted by 
looking beyond the four corners of the Idaho Constitution. Despite such recognition, however, 
the Court failed to analyze the case in light of the statute that is directly on point regarding public 
use - Idaho Code (i 7-701. 
Cohen is further distinguishable in light of the fact that the claimants seeking to privately 
condemn access already had legally available alternative access by way of Lake Coeur d'Alene. 
Cohen, 125 Idaho at 85 n.3 ("The development the group seeks can occur with or without this 
road."). Thus, this existing legal access further distinguishes Cohen from the issues at bar. The 
Court in Cohen held only that the development of seven lakeside houses or condominiums on 
Lake Coeur d'Alene with legally available water access is not a "public use" under Article I, 
Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution. Cohen's holding, therefore, does not apply to Backmans' 
claim to privately condemn access pursuant to Idaho Code $ 7-701(5) and is limited to its facts 
Spagon attempts to characterize Dengler v. IIuzel Blessinger Family Trusr as an 
affirmation of Spagon's overly broad reading of Cohen. This reading is a red herring. Spagon 
states that the Court in Dengler "rejected the proposition of condemnation to a private residence 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - Page 8 
I : \) 547.1 I lUPPI:Ai~\Appcllanls' Reply Bricfdoc 
as a reasonable alternative." Brief of Respondents Spagon, el a/., p. 3 1-32. Dengler, however, 
involved a claim by prospective purchasers of property against the vendor for breach of contract 
when the vendor failed to obtain an easement to access the subject landlocked property. 
141 ldaho 123, 129 (2005) . The Court found that obtaining the access easement was a condition 
precedent to the vendor's conveyance of the property, and failure of the condition excused the 
vendor's performance. Id. After the Court determined that the vendors' attempts to obtain an 
access easement were reasonable, the prospective purchasers at oral argument claimed that the 
vendor should have condemned access to the property. Id. The Court rejected this notion 
stating that, "pursuant to Idaho Code the only relevant use of condemnation relates to 'Byroads, 
leading from highways to residences and farms.' I.C. § 7-701(5). The prooerty at issue here was 
neither a residence nor a farm." Id. (emphasis added). The Court further determined that where 
the contract called for "reasonable" terms regarding the easement, condemnation was not a 
reasonable requirement to impose on the vendor. Id. 
Thus, the issue in Dengler was whether the vendor should have condemned access 
through adjacent property to satisfy the condition precedent in the contract. The Court found that 
the property was not a residence or farm and, therefore, condemning access would not be a 
public use under Idaho Code 3 7-701(5). Contrary to Spagon's assertion, the Courl in Dengler 
did not hold that condemning access to a residence is unreasonable. Rather, the Court in Dengler 
determined only that the parties' contract did not require the vendor to condemn access to the 
subject property. Id. 
The determination as lo whether a party is entitled to exercise the right of private 
condemnation is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. McKenney v 
Anselmo, 91 ldaho 118, 122 (1966); Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266,270 (1950). The fact that 
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Backmans seek to build one (1) residence on each of the five (5) 20-acre parcels on the Backman 
Property is undisputed. Backmans' desire to build residences on the Backman Property is a 
public use for which Backmans may privately condemn access pursuant to Idaho Code 
5 7-701(5). 
The additional facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate the following: 
1) Backmans' desired residential development of the Backman Property (one [I]  residence on 
each of the five [5] 20-acre parcels) is equal to or less invasive than the residential development 
in Section 7, which consists of residences on 10- or 20-acre parcels; and, 2) the Backman 
Property is landlocked. Backmans seek to condemn routes to the Backman Property that have 
existed for over seventy (70) years. Spagon and Grant have not and do not now suggest a 
specific, alternate route is both legally available to Backmans and more reasonable than 
Backmans' proposed routes. The access which Backmans desire to condemn is necessary for the 
use of the Backman Property. The Backman Property is landlocked and there is no legally 
available alternative access. Backmans' proposed development is virtually identical to the 
development in Section 7. For these reasons, this Court should hold that Backmans are 
permitted to condemn access to the Backman Property. The case should be remanded to the 
District Court to determine the compcnsation to be paid for the condemnation and the scope of 
the easement. 
At least one state has held that its private condemnation statute effectively abrogates 
common law easement by necessity claims in that state. In Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court held that its legislaturc resolved the competing policy considerations 
supporting the productivity of land and opposing the taking of a landowner's property without 
compensation by enacting a statute permitting private condemnation. 81 1 P.2d 287, 289 
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(Wyo. 1991) . Wyoming's condemnation statute is more specific than Idaho's in its applicability 
to landlocked property owners, stating that "Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor 
connection with a public road, may apply in writing ... for a private road leading from his 
premises to some convenient public road.? Wyoming Statutes 9 24-9-101. Although Idaho's 
condemnation statute does not so specifically refer to landlocked property, this Court could 
determine, as the Wyoming Supreme Court determined, that the legislature's intent regarding 
Idaho Code 5 7-701(5) was to balance competing policy interests and provide a mechanism for 
obtaining access to landlocked property for certain enumerated purposes. Such a determination 
would, effectively, make Idaho Code $ 7-701 a last resort for parties seeking to obtain access to 
landlocked property while promoting the public policies of this State. 
C. The District Court's Dismissal Of Backmans' Prescriative Easement Claim Should 
Be Reversed And The Case Should Be Remanded To The District Court For A 
Determination As To Whether Backmans Proved The Five Elements Of A 
Prescriptive Easement. 
Backmans submit that the District Court erred as a matter of law by misapplying various 
presumptions not applicable to Backmans' prescriptive easement claim. The District Court erred 
in characterizing Powers's use as "public," in applying the wild and unenclosed lands 
presumption, and in applying the common use rule. As a result of these errors, the District Court 
did not properly consider the evidence presented as it pertained to the five elements of a 
prescriptive easement claim. Backmans submit that the record contains ample evidence to 
support a finding that their immediate predecessor-in-interest's, Randy Powers, use of Turtle 
Rock RoadlSyringa Creek Road and the extensions thereto satisfied the five elements of a 
prescriptive easement claim. For these reasons, this Court should remand the case to the District 
Court. 
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D. The District Court Erred In Failinv To Combine Easement By Necessity, Private 
Condemnation AndlOr Prescrintive Easement Theories To Provide Access To The 
Landlocked Backman Property. 
The District Court should have permitted Backmans to combine the theories of easement 
by necessity, private condemnation and/or prescriptive easement to provide access to the 
landlocked Backman Property. Spagon and Grant do not cite to any authority prohibiting the 
combination of these theories. This case should be remanded to the District Court for a 
determination as to the theories to be used to provide Backmans with access to the Backman 
Property and the scope of such access in light of the facts and circumstances of this case. 
E. S n a ~ o n  And Grant Are Not Entitled To Attorneys' Fees And Costs On Apneal. 
Backmans' appeal asks this Court to review the District Court's conclusions of law. 
Backmans do not invite this Court to second-guess the District Court's factual findings. 
'Therefore, this Court should decline to award Spagon and Grant their costs and attorney fees on 
appeal. See, Becksreadv. f'rice, 146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876,888 (2008). 
11. 
CONCLUSION 
The Backman Property is landlocked and at the mercy of the adjacent landowners who 
have refused to grant Backmans an easement. Public policy in Idaho supports the use of 
property. The District Court erred in denying Backmans' easement by necessity, private 
condemnation and prescriptive easement claims. The District Court also erred in declining to 
combine such theories to provide access to the Backman Property. As Backmans' appeal seeks 
the review of the District Court's conclusions of law, Spagon and Grant are not entitled to 
attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. 
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This Court should either reverse the District Court's decision and hold that Backmans are 
entitled to a prescriptive easement or easement by necessity, or to condemn an easement to 
access their landlocked property, or remand to the District Court to make a decision consistent 
with this Court's opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this loth day of November 2008. 
MEULEMAN MOLLERUP LLP 
By: 
Attorneys ~ o ~ A ~ ~ e l l a 6 s  
Bob Backman and Rhonda Backman 
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